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The Civil Rights Act of 19911 and the Voting Rights Amendments of
19822 stand as the two most significant pieces of civil rights legislation of the
past ten years. Like their predecessors, the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 4 they are cornerstones of the movement to achieve
equality through the law. In an era when increasing numbers of strategists and
academics have encouraged civil rights advocates to take their cause to legisla-
tures, not courts, these laws represent the triumph of political savvy and
popular sovereignty. By passing these laws, the people's representatives have
overturned a number of restrictive Supreme Court rulings that narrowed the
scope of voting rights and employment discrimination law.
At the same time, however, there is a darker side to these legislative
triumphs. While both pieces of legislation constituted successes for the civil
rights movement, they were also defeats. The debates surrounding both the
Voting Rights and Civil Rights Acts were about more than discrete pieces of
legislation. They were also debates about the appropriate vision of civil rights,
about the definitions of discrimination and equality, and most fundamentally,
about what steps the nation needs to take in the struggle for racial and gender
justice. In this broader sense, the civil rights leadership lost more than it
gained.
This Article will examine the debate surrounding the Voting Rights and
Civil Rights Acts. In both legislative debates the civil rights forces were
presented with the challenge of articulating and defending their vision of civil
rights. The Voting Rights Act required a commitment to an effects test over
an intent test, a race-conscious model over a race-blind model, and to outcome
as a means of measuring opportunity. The Civil Rights Act required the
endorsement of race-based preferences in employment, government imposed
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1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1992).
2. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1988)).
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
4. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1988)).
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restraints on the managerial prerogative of corporate America, and an active
judiciary equipped to defend victims of employment discrimination. While the
logic of the two legislative proposals required an endorsement of such a civil
rights vision, the civil rights lobby failed to provide it. As I will argue, the
most notable aspect of both debates was the consistency with which the civil
rights leadership undermined itself and the civil rights struggle with its unwill-
ingness to articulate and defend the vision underlying each legislative package.
In the process of winning the passage of these pieces of legislation, the civil
rights forces repudiated much of their civil rights vision.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I addresses the legislative process
leading to the passage of the Voting Rights Amendments. It argues that despite
ultimate legislative success, the debate took a form that led the civil rights
leadership to believe that it could prevail even without fully articulating the
principles underlying its demands. Part II will provide a similar examination
of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, arguing that the Act's sup-
porters were again unwilling to present the true nature of their claims, and
were thus unable to effectively respond to attacks by the Act's opponents. My
analysis of both the Voting Rights Amendments and Civil Rights Act will focus
on the House and Senate debates, particularly the Committee testimony, as
well as the debates that took place in the popular press. Part III will compare
the success of the Voting Rights and Civil Rights Acts. It argues that notwith-
standing the passage of these pieces of legislation, the rhetorical and ideologi-
cal tactics adopted by the civil rights leadership have done little to further, and
may even have damaged, the civil rights movement.
I. THE VOTING RIGHTS AMENDMENTS OF 1982
The passage of the Voting Rights Amendments was a two-stage process.
While identical bills were introduced in the House and Senate on April 7,
1981, the legislation proceeded through the two houses on different tracks.'
The legislation was first considered by the House of Representatives, as its
sponsors concluded that its chances of success would be greater in the House,
which was controlled by the Democrats, rather than in the Senate, controlled
by the Republicans.6
Over 18 days of hearings were devoted to the House bill (H.R. 3112). In
all, over 100 witnesses testified before the House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.7 The debate before the
5. Robert Pear, Congress Begins Fight Over Extension of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, April 8,
1981, at A10.
6. Clouds Gathering in Congress Over the Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 1981, § 4, at
4.
7. S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1982).
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Subcommittee focused almost exclusively on two issues: 1) whether to extend
the Section 5 pre-clearance requirements, which mandated that selected juris-
dictions submit to the Justice Department any proposed modifications of
electoral procedures, and 2) what, if any, mechanism would be available for
covered jurisdictions to escape, or "bail-out" of, the Section 5 pre-clearance
requirements. H.R. 3112 was reported out of the Subcommittee by a unani-
mous vote without amendment.' After three days of consideration by the full
Judiciary Committee, the bill was reported to the House.' The floor debate,
like the debate before the Subcommittee, centered on the preclearance and bail-
out provisions. Eventually, the bill passed by a wide margin.1"
While the House debate was lengthy and vigorous, there was virtually no
discussion of the proposed provisions altering Section 2. While Section 5
mandates Justice Department review of selected jurisdictions, Section 2
establishes the standards for challenging the electoral procedures of any
jurisdiction in the country, regardless of whether it is covered by Section 5.
It is here that the debate over the intent and effects standards would take place.
The question of intent versus effects was a critical one because it forced into
focus two visions of civil rights. The first measures progress by better results
and views discrimination as pervasive, systemic and often unintentional. The
other measures progress by increased opportunity and sees discrimination as
the occasional actions of ill-intentioned actors. While the House debate was
by no means a foregone conclusion, it failed to focus on these issues and
therefore did not present the bill's sponsors with the challenge of articulating
and defending their civil rights vision. That challenge would come in the
Senate.
A. The Conservative Critique
Supporters of the bill were brimming with confidence as they introduced
it in the Senate. Although President Reagan continued to oppose a number of
the provisions in the House bill, he had indicated that he endorsed an extension
of the Voting Rights Act, stating that "The right to vote is the crown jewel
of American liberties, and we will not see its luster diminished."11 Sixty-one
senators introduced a bill identical to that passed in the House. The principal
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Julia Malone, Civil Rights Surprise-Rush of Support to Renew Voting Rights Act, CHRISTLAN Sci.
MoNrrOR, Dec. 17, 1981, at 3.
11. Robert Pear, Reagan Backs Voting Rights Act But Wants To Ease Requirements, N.Y TIMEs, Nov.
7, 1981, § 1, at 1. Reagan opposed the effects test, saying "I believe that the act should retain the 'intent'
test under existing law, rather than changing to a new and untested 'effects' standard." Id.
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sponsors were Senators Kennedy and Mathias. 2 Hill watchers noted that
passage of the Amendments seemed probable. The Christian Science Monitor
reported that the large number of cosponsors for the bill "will make renewal
difficult to oppose. And it shows that even in its conservative mood, Congress
is reluctant to turn its back on the Voting Rights Act, widely acclaimed as the
most important civil rights legislation ever passed."13
Some in the Senate opposed the legislation on the grounds that it unfairly
singled out the South and that it did not allow covered jurisdictions sufficient
opportunity to escape Justice Department review. Senator Jesse Helms argued,
"The act is no longer needed . . . .It is unfair to single out certain areas of
the country .. .for federal intervention."14 And Senator Strom Thurmond
said that "this federal law, just as others, should apply to everybody and at
the same time give everybody an equal chance to seek relief from the unusual
requirements of federal preclearance of state laws." 5
Despite the comments of Senators Helms and Thurmond, by the time the
Voting Rights Amendments got to the Senate, the contentious issues had been
narrowed considerably. Senator Hatch, who would lead the Senate conserva-
tives, indicated in his opening statement before the initial hearing on the Act,
that "there seems to be little disagreement that the provisions of the Voting
Rights Act ought to be extended. That is certainly my view, and, I believe,
the view of a substantial majority of the Senate." 6 Satisfied with the manner
in which the House had resolved the majority of questions regarding the
Amendments, the Senate would limit its discussion to one issue: whether
challenges under Section 2 should be governed by an effects test or by an
intent test.
According to Hatch, the results test embodied in the House bill was at odds
with the way America defined civil rights. It would transform the Voting
Rights Act from a provision "designed to insure equal access and equal
opportunity in the electoral process to [a] provision designed to insure equal
outcome and equal success."17 Moreover, the results test is
totally at odds with everything that the Constitution has been directed at since the
Reconstruction amendments, Brown v. Board of Education, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. It is at odds with the notion that Representatives owe their allegiance
to individual citizens, not to racial or ethnic blocs. It is at odds with the most
fundamental ideas of federalism and local self-government. Indeed, the very term
12. Mary Thornton, Bipartisan Senate Group Backs Extension of Voting Rights Act, WAsH. POST,
Dec. 17, 1981, at A4.
13. Malone, supra note 10.
14. Bessie Ford, The Voting Rights Act-A Civil Rights Guarantee or Slur on the South?, UPI, Feb.
14, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
15. Id.
16. 1 Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1982: Hearings on S.53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S.1992,
and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Voting Rights Hearings 1].
17. Id. at 3.
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"discriminatory results" is purest Orwellianism in radically transforming the
concept of discrimination from a decisionmaking process into an end or an
outcome in and of itself."
By providing a concise summary of how the bill's opponents defined equality
Hatch's comments set the stage for the debate on the bill. Professor James
Blumstein of Vanderbilt law school added the final nuance to the conservative's
definition of discrimination. Blumstein said,
If you will indulge me in an anecdote, there is the old story about the Mississippi
registrar that is lining up a bunch of farmers, three whites and one black, and they
are administering the old literacy test. The registrar asks the white farmers to read
from the U.S. Constitution; they do, and they are all registered. The black farmer
comes up and the registrar shows him a copy of the Peking Daily and says, "Can
you read that?" The farmer, much to her surprise, says, "Well, yes I can." She
says, in utter shock, "Well, what does it say?" He says, "Well, it says that blacks
ain't going to vote in Mississippi this year. "19
"That," concluded Blumstein, "is discrimination. When you see that kind of
disparate treatment where there is a clear distinction based upon race, that is
what I see as discrimination. "'20
Hatch and Blumstein had ably outlined one vision of civil rights. Their
vision of equality emphasized individuals over groups, states' rights over
national power, process over results. Their vision of discrimination emphasized
the overt discriminatory actions of individuals and institutions with evil mo-
tives. Moreover, according to Hatch, their vision was not simply one of many
competing visions: it was the consensus vision of the nation as a whole.
Referring to the civil rights leadership's definition of discrimination, Hatch
contended that he did not "believe that you [could] find 1 person in 100 in
Boston, Baltimore, or Cleveland, black or white, who would define discrimina-
tion in this manner. "21
The vision of civil rights, discrimination, and equality put forth by Hatch
and Blumstein at the opening of the proceedings continued to motivate the
conservative critique of the effects test throughout the course of the hearings.
Using language remarkably similar to the language they would use eight years
later when attacking the Civil Rights Act, the opposition claimed that an effects
test would result in quotas and proportional representation for minorities.
According to Representative Thomas Briley, if the effects test were main-
tained, "you're going to have quota systems set up throughout much of the
country ... . " Similarly, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,
William Bradford Reynolds argued that the effects test will produce "quotas
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 1333.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 477.
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in the electoral process. "23 In his testimony before the Senate, Attorney
General William French Smith said that the results test will produce "propor-
tional representation" or "quotas. " 24 He elaborated further in a column in the
New York Times: "[T]he [effects] test would be triggered whenever election
results did not mirror the population mix of a particular community, and could
gradually lead to a system of proportional representation based on race or
minority language status-essentially a quota system for electoral politics."'
This quota system would be "inconsistent with the democratic traditions of our
pluralistic society" for it "is based on and would foster the abhorrent notion
that blacks can only be represented by blacks and whites can only be represent-
ed by whites."26
The bill itself contained no endorsement of quotas or proportional represen-
tation. Its opponents argued, however, that even if such quotas were not
explicitly mandated by the bill, governments would turn to quotas rather than
face voting rights suits alleging a disproportionately low number of minority
elected officials. The bill's opponents contended that local governments would
redraw their districts to ensure that the number of minority elected officials
closely mirrored the number of minority citizens. For example, one opposition
witness argued that "the effects test will have an inevitable tendency to lead
to racial quotas," because "human beings are remarkably quick to find the
shortest way to avoid trouble with the authorities. "27 Under the effects test,
local officials "will note that an elected body with a racial composition unpro-
portionate to that of the voting population may well be taken by the authorities
as proof of discrimination .... 28 Because these officials want to avoid
conflict, "the proper course will instantly spring to mind: Contrive matters so
as to assure an elected body with a racial composition proportionate to that of
the voting population."29 Such action should not be encouraged, because
"[h]owever explained, however disguised, however rationalized, that is a quota
system . ",30
The bill contained a disclaimer provision which said that the lack of
proportional representation would not "in and of itself" constitute a violation.
However, this provision would do little to prevent quotas, said the bill's
opponents, because it would only have relevance "after election systems had
been restructured to guarantee as nearly as possible that proportional represen-
23. Id. at 1690.
24. Id. at 74.
25. William French Smith, The Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1982, § 1, at 23.
26. Id.
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tation would result."3" According to Attorney General Smith, the entire Act
created such strong pressure to ensure quota representation that the disclaimer
provision would have little meaning."
The bill's opponents also criticized the effects test because it focused on
race. They complained that in order to determine whether a violation had
occurred, a judge would have to examine the racial composition of the legisla-
ture and compare it to the racial composition of the community. The bill's
opponents opposed such an emphasis on race. Professor Henry Abraham
criticized the results test on the grounds that it "would exacerbate race con-
sciousness, not any particular race per se, necessarily, but certainly race con-
sciousness. ""3 Another critic indicated that the results test "assumes that there
is no escape from race." 34 The results test would "institutionalize racial
division" and encourage Americans "to cleave to some organized faction
.... Moreover, in implementing a remedy, a judge would have to redraw
districts to ensure that some contained large numbers of minorities. Attorney
General Smith objected to such race-conscious assumptions about the voting
habits of black and white voters: "I think the concept, the idea, or the institu-
tionalizing of a system which would be based upon the premise that blacks are
going to vote for black candidates and whites are going to vote for white
candidates is a very unfortunate scheme."36
In addition to its emphasis on race, numbers, and results, the effects test
angered many opponents because it did not require proof of an evil motive to
sustain a violation. The test was criticized on the grounds that it simply
assumed discriminatory intent without requiring any proof. The proponents of
the results test "presume that all effects which are adverse to the political
interests of minority group citizens are rooted in some impure motive. I do not
believe such a presumption to be valid. " Moreover, because discriminatory
motive was assumed without proof, "even if there was no intent nor any shred
of evidence that there was an intent to discriminate, a whole community or
political subdivision could be branded as a discriminatory political community,
subdivision, or division."" Before you start "calling whole communities
racist or discriminatory," said Senator Hatch, "it seems to me that you have
31. Smith, supra note 25.
32. Id.
33. Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 1250.
34. Abigail Thernstrom, The Odd Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 55 PuB. INT. 49 (1979),
reprinted in 2 Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1982: Hearings on S.53, S.1761, S.1975,
S. 1992, and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcornm on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 2nd Seas. 446 (1982) [hereinafter Voting Rights Hearings 11].
35. Id. at 752.
36. Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 75.
37. id. at 521-22 (testimony of Rep. Caldwell Butler).
38. Id. at 600 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
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got to have somebody who at least acted with the intent to discriminate.""
The final element of the opposition's criticism of the bill concerned the role
of the courts. This critique took two forms. The predominant criticism was
that the bill would put too much power in the hands of judges. William
Bradford Reynolds complained that a government found to have violated the
Voting Rights Act faced severe consequences: it means that "jurisdictions [are]
required to restructure their governmental systems, not at the insistence or
behest of the electorate but rather at the whim and wish of a Federal judge
.. . ." Another witness noted that a federal district court judge had recently
struck down at-large districts and replaced them with single-member districts.
He criticized this "rather astonishing exercise of judicial power," which was
likely to occur even more frequently if the Voting Rights Amendments were
passed.4 Such judicial law-making was especially inappropriate, according to
Senator East, in light of the fact that the 1980 elections indicated that "there
was some desire in this country among the American people that perhaps, as
regards bureaucratic elitism and judicial elitism having usurped the legislative
process, it was about time that the Congress tried to reclaim its fundamental
policymaking role in the American system."42 A secondary criticism of the
bill was that, by making it easier for plaintiffs to prove voting rights violations,
it would overburden the already heavily burdened federal docket. Representa-
tive Hyde noted that the bill would add to the "tidal-wave of litigation that's
inundating the present Federal court system.'
At first blush it may appear that the rhetoric of the bill's opponents was
significantly more sweeping than was the likely impact of the bill. While this
disparity is attributable in part to the nature of lobbying, testifying, and the
legislative process, this explanation is only a partial one. The broad rhetorical
assault was due principally to the opposition's awareness that more was at
stake than simply the Voting Rights Amendments. Throughout the debate,
conservatives exhibited an awareness that the debate over the nature of equality
and discrimination would have an impact on future legislative battles as well
as an impact on the way America thought and talked about civil rights.
Witness after witness for the opposition drew parallels to other areas of
equality law, and indicated that opposition to Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Amendments was linked to opposition to other civil rights developments. The
attempt to institute an effects test, said one witness, is a significant departure
from the traditional definition of equality. "The old assumption that equal
access to the ballot would ineluctably lead to political power for minorities has
39. Id. at 619.
40. Id. at 1691.
41. Id. at 232 (testimony of Walter Berns).
42. Id. at 30-31.
43. Id. at 410.
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given way to the proposition that the political process must produce something
more than equal access."" The witness continued, "[t]he new demand is that
the political process, regardless of equal access, must be made to yield equal
results. "' The new emphasis on results "parallels other demands that have
been pressed so assiduously upon the political system, especially in the area
of affirmative action . . . . " Another witness testified that he opposed a
results test in voting rights for the same reasons he opposed other changes in
antidiscrimination law. When discrimination is defined "by some numbers
standard," society begins to stop looking for the "best qualified person" and
instead provides "preferential treatment on the basis of race or sex."' Doing
this runs counter to the "general ethic that individuals should be treated as
individuals irrespective of their origins, sex, and background."48 Finally,
Senator Hatch candidly admitted that the debate was about much more than
voting rights. "The proponents want the effects test knowing that if they can
get it here, then they could have similar success in other areas of civil
rights. "49
Following the lead set by Senator Hatch in his opening statement, the
conservatives had forcefully argued their case against the Voting Rights
Amendments. They argued that the bill would force proportional representation
upon local governments, would define equality by outcome rather than result,
would pressure society into thinking in terms of race, would allow local
communities to be branded as racist without proving the allegations, and would
give more power and an increased workload to the judiciary, the least account-
able branch of government. Moreover, the opposition made their arguments
with an eye to future civil rights battles.
B. The Proponents Respond
In articulating their vision of civil rights, equality and discrimination, the
opposition had challenged the proponents of the Voting Rights Amendments
to put forward an alternative vision. The Hearings on the bill were an opportu-
nity for the civil rights leadership to take up that challenge. Unfortunately, they
did not do so.
The first argument advanced in favor of the effects test was that it was
44. 1&. at 489 (testimony of Dr. Edward Erler).
45. Id.
46. Id. See also statement of John Bunzel, id. at 652 ("Originally, Mr. Chairman, the Voting Rights
Act was clear that it was directed to remedying disenfranchisement. Now there is considerable talk of
dilution. Again, this parallels the language of the new equality in affirmative action, where proportionate
results become the test of discrimination.")
47. Id. at 649 (statement of John Bunzel).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 405.
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simply a restoration of the law before the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile
v. Bolden.5" "The original intent of Congress in enacting section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act was not to require an intent standard, but rather to require
an effects standard," argued Frank Parker, a leading voting rights litigator.5"
"[Mobile] itself was the change. The amendment restores the original intent
of Congress and would also restore the legal standard applied by the courts
prior to the Mobile decision."52 This point was repeated consistently through-
out the testimony. 3
However, the claim that the Amendments were simply restoring the law
to its previous state was subject to criticism on the grounds of both veracity
and relevance. Attorney General Smith contested the accuracy of the claim,
testifying that "the Mobile case did not change the law. As a matter of fact,
the Mobile case was the first U.S. Supreme Court case to pass on Section
2. Smith had the advantage of Mobile itself on his side, for the Supreme
Court had expressly claimed that its decision was consistent with precedent.55
Ultimately, this debate was unresolved, with the proponents of the bill claiming
that the cases before Mobile endorsed an effects test, while the opponents of
the bill argued that the earlier cases used an intent test.
An exchange between Senator Leahy and Mr. Reynolds is indicative of the
character of the debate. Leahy, who supported the results test embodied in the
House bill, asked Reynolds: "You do not think that [the hearings on the House
bill] make it crystal clear that Congress is trying to reinstate a sizable body
of case law . . . like White v. Regester and Zimmer v. McKeithen?"56
Reynolds, who endorsed the intent test, responded that, "those cases are fully
consistent with my testimony and with my statement and do not at all suggest
the kind of test that would be required under the amendment to the House
bill. 7
50. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
51. Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 1183.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., id. at 245, 250 (statement of Benjamin Hooks).
54. Id. at 73. Smith also maintained that it was the intent of Section 2's framers to "paraphrase the
15th Amendment" which "has been long held to require an intent test." Id. at 96.
55. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 62, 67-68 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). The Mobile dissenters, like the
bill's supporters, maintained that the Supreme Court's decision was contrary to settled law. See, e.g., id.
at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The plurality's approach requiring proof of discriminatory purpose in
the present cases is, then, squarely contrary to White and its predecessors.").
56. Voting Rights Hearings I, supra note 16, at 1696; White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973);
Zimmer v. Mckeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
57. Id. This debate raged on the pages of the Washington Post as well. In an editorial the Post asserted
that the effects test "would simply reinstate the standard used by the courts before the Supreme Court
decision in Mobile v. Bolden." Voting Rights Be Strong, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1982, at A18, reprinted
in Voting Rights Hearings II, supra note 34, at 769. William Bradford Reynolds responded in a letter to
the editor saying that Mobile was not a revision. Letter to the Editor, WASH. PosT, Feb. 11, 1982, at A22,
reprinted in Voting Rights Hearings II, supra note 34, at 770. The Post took the unusual step of responding
to William's letter to the editor by again asserting that Mobile was a revision. Editorial, WASH. POST, Feb.
11, 1982, at A22, reprinted in Voting Rights Hearings 11, supra note 34, at 770-71.
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The fundamental weakness with the argument that the bill did nothing more
that restore the law to its pre-Mobile state was that it ignored the question of
whether such a restoration was desirable. Senator Hatch, for example, pointed
out that those who opposed the effects standard did so for reasons more
fundamental than the fact that they believed it changed the law. "From my own
perspective I would oppose the results test and I would oppose overturning the
Mobile decision, whatever the state of the law 5, 10, or 50 years ago. I would
guess that proponents of the results test would feel similarly.""
Forced to explain the policy justifications for the effects standard, the
supporters of the bill offered the argument that the effects standard was
desirable because the alternative, the intent standard, was too difficult to prove.
According to Benjamin Hooks, Chairman of the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights and one of the bill's principal supporters, the primary difference
between the Administration proposal, which included an intent standard, and
the House version, which used an effects test, "is that the Administration
[proposal] would make it difficult, if not impossible, to ever win a
case. . . "" Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School argued that
"to continue to require proof of subjective purpose in the form prescribed in
the plurality opinion of the City of Mobile case is to erect and maintain an
almost insuperable obstacle to securing [the right to vote]. "I According to
the bill's opponents, the intent test was problematic because of the difficulty
in determining the collective intent of a group of individuals such as a legisla-
ture.6" In addition, legislatures can maintain a law with a nondiscriminatory
purpose for discriminatory reasons, and proving the intent of such legislative
inaction is virtually impossible.62
Like the assertion that the intent test was a break from precedent, the
argument that the intent test made it more difficult to win cases was subject
to straightforward contrary assertions as well as criticisms regarding its
relevance. Reynolds, for example, argued that discriminatory intent is not
impossible to prove because a smoking gun is not required. Instead, circum-
58. Voting Rights Hearings I, supra note 16, at 644. The only advantage gained from the argument
that the bill was a restoration of law to it's pre-Mobile status was that the proponents of the results test
were able to claim that their proposal would not raise any unforeseen problems (e.g., quotas). For example,
the Judiciary Committee report argued that, "there is, in short, an extensive, reliable and reassuring track
record of court decisions using the very standard which the Committee bill would codify." S. Rep. No.
417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1982).
59. Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 256. See also id., at 563 (testimony of Joaquin Avila,
associate counsel, Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
60. Id., at 1417.
61. Frank Parker of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights argued that the intent standard is almost
impossible to meet because it requires proving "what is in the minds of legislators or voters who adopted
or maintained a discriminatory electoral system." CONG.Q., Jan. 9, 1982, reprinted in Voting Rights
Hearings 11, supra note 34, at 766. The Washington Post added that the effects test is preferable because
the intent standard "is virtually impossible to meet since the legislators in question have all been dead for
years." Voting Rights Be Strong, supra note 57.
62. See Voting Rights Hearings I, supra note 16, at 1417-18.
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stantial evidence could be used to prove intent.63 Similarly, the bill's oppo-
nents argued that intent cannot be impossible to prove given that voting rights
cases had been won after Mobile." More importantly, however, the oppo-
nents pressed the point that no legal standard should be adopted on the grounds
that it "facilitates successful prosecutions." 65 The bill's opponents complained
that "there has been no principled opposition to the intent standard; the opposi-
tion really comes on the basis of pragmatism, that is, the problem of proof.""
The proponents of the bill had argued, somewhat unsuccessfully, that the
effects standard should be instituted because it had been the law before Mobile
v. Bolden and because it made it easier to prove voting discrimination. While
these arguments were important, the proponents of the bill had yet to respond
to the heart of the opposition critique. They had yet to respond to the challenge
that the Amendments sought proportional representation, that they gave racial
considerations undue prominence, and that they focused on outcome instead
of process.
Charges that they were seeking proportional representation angered the
bill's supporters. According to Benjamin Hooks, the proportional representa-
tion criticism is a "red herring." He said, "I know of no civil rights group...
seeking proportional representation. We are not seeking a mirror image of the
ethnic classifications of neighborhoods or cities. We are simply seeking the
unfettered right to vote without having to prove that which is sometimes not
susceptible to proof.'67 Similarly, the ACLU's Southern Regional Director,
Laughlin McDonald, argued that under an effects standard, "[tihere is no way
the court ... can insure proportional representation. All the court can do is
establish a system of access."68 The New York Times editorialized that quotas
were not imposed in one case "[fjrom 1965 to 1980, when the law favored
civil rights lawyers . "..."69
While civil rights advocates were correct in their assessment that it was
essential to respond to the charges of quotas and proportional representation,
they ignored the fact that these terms were simply code-words used by conser-
63. Letter to Editor, supra note 57.
64. See Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 406 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
65. Id. at 393-94 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
66. Id. at 1333 (testimony of Prof. James Blumstein, Vanderbilt Law School). Fortunately, the
Committee Report did not take the stance taken throughout the debate by the proponents of the bill. While
it noted that the intent standard is a difficult one, it asserted that the principal reason the Committee rejected
intent was because "the test asks the wrong question." The Report continued, "if an electoral system
operates today to exclude blacks or Hispanics from a fair chance to participate, then the matter of what
motives were in an official's mind 100 years ago is of the most limited relevance." S. Rep., supra note
58, at 36.
67. Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 246. See also id. at 632 (testimony of Michael
Walpert, Esq.).
68. Id. at 373.
69. Voting Rights Are Not Quotas, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1982, at A30, reprinted in Voting Rights
Hearings II, supra note 34, at 780.
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vative congressmen and witnesses as proxies for a more fundamental critique.
When Senator Hatch argued that the results test would produce quotas he was
really arguing that the results test would produce a race-conscious, outcome-
oriented legal regime. As he indicated in his opening statement, focusing on
results would transform "the concept of discrimination from a decisionmaking
process into an end or an outcome in and of itself."70 While Hatch may have
overstated his case, he was correct. The amendments did require a focus on
outcome, if not as an end in and of itself, at least as the starting point in
determining whether the decisionmaking process was flawed. Such a transfor-
mation in the definition of equality was precisely what was required by the
results test and the vision of civil rights that served as its foundation. Such a
transformation was precisely what the civil rights leadership was implicitly
demanding. However, when challenged to articulate their alternative principles,
the civil rights leadership not only declined the opportunity, they repudiated
much of their underlying vision.
That the civil rights community had a vision of voting rights that measured
equality by results was indisputable. Black leaders throughout the South had
been demanding for years that their representation in government approximate
their numbers in the population. Dr. Willie Gibson of the South Carolina
NAACP, for example, opposed a recent redistricting plan, saying, "[U]nless
we see a plan that has the possibility of blacks having the probability of being
elected in proportion to this population, we will push for a new plan."'" He
added that "South Carolina's population is approximately 30 percent black,
and 30 percent of the senate should be black. "72 Similarly, Rev. Jesse Jackson
told the Columbia Sun, "Blacks comprise one-third of the State of South
Carolina's population and deserve one-third of its representation. We believe
that taxation without representation is tyranny. "' Moreover, the rhetoric of
the civil rights leadership indicated it measured the fairness of the process by
examining results. A paper published by the Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law indicated that "[iln some areas of the country, black and
Hispanic voters are denied equal access to the political process by racial gerry-
mandering, discriminatory at-large elections, and other electoral devices which
minimize and cancel out minority voting strength."" To demonstrate the
denial of access the Lawyers Committee pointed to the fact that "[iun Mobile,
Alabama, for example, blacks constitute 35 percent of the population, but no
black person has been elected to the all-white city council since at-large voting
70. Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 5.
71. Id. at 252 (Sen. Hatch quoting Dr. Willie Gibson).
72. Id. at 255.
73. Id. (Sen. Hatch quoting Rev. Jesse Jackson).
74. LAWYER'S COMMrrEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE
SECTION 2 "REsULTS" STANDARD OF S. 1992, reprinted in Voting Rights Hearings I, supra note 57, at
709.
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was adopted in 1911."15
A number of members of the House made it clear that they believed dispa-
rate results were an indication of inequality. Representative Don Edwards, the
floor manager of the House bill, argued that an effects test was needed because
"[t]he impact of the Mobile decision has been devastating. The U.S. Justice
Department abandoned its suit against South Carolina, 30 percent black, the
sole remaining state in the Deep South with an all-white legislative body-the
state senate. Indeed, a black has not been elected to the South Carolina state
senate in this century." 76 Representative Robert Garcia said, "[tihe proof of
discrimination under the amended Section 2 is the number of people who get
elected."' Similarly, a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights report criticized
the fact that "[i]n none of the Southern States covered under the preclearance
provisions of the Voting Rights Act were blacks elected to public office at a
rate approaching their proportion in the population.""8
Given the tendency of civil rights leaders, and even a number of govern-
ment officials, to use equal electoral results as a measure of voting rights
equality, and given the fact that the bill's proponents were advocating a
standard that would allow disparate results to be used to prove discrimination,
it was somewhat surprising that not one supporter of the bill attempted to
articulate or justify this outcome-based vision of civil rights. Not one supporter
of the bill attempted to explain why it made sense to evaluate whether the
process was nondiscriminatory by first determining whether the results were
nondiscriminatory. Instead, the bill's supporters relied on the two aforemen-
tioned arguments-that the effects test was only a restoration of settled law and
that the effects test was an easier standard to meet than the intent test.79
When pressed on the question of proportional representation, the bill's
supporters retreated to one of two positions. First, they argued that even a
results-oriented approach that attempted to create majority black districts did
not achieve proportional representation because black voters often elected white
candidates. This analysis was typified in the testimony of the ACLU's Laughlin
McDonald, who said that blacks were still losing elections even in areas in
which successful voting rights litigation had been brought. McDonald testified
that "we have never gotten proportional representation"-that in case after
case, even after the court restructures districts to create majority black dis-
tricts, those districts continue to elect white representatives.' °
The second line of response was typified by the testimony of Benjamin
75. Id.
76. CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14, 1982, at 27.
77. Voting Rights Hearings II, supra note 34, at 3.
78. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS (1981),
reprinted in Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 1172.
79. The Senate Judiciary Committee report was the one exception. See supra note 66.
80. Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 373.
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Hooks, who, in an effort to escape the proportional representation criticism,
ended up repudiating the outcome-based vision of civil rights. In his testimony
before the Senate, Hooks was confronted by Hatch on the question of whether
the bill's supporters were attempting to replace a definition of equality which
focused on process with one that focused on results. Believing this to be the
case, Hatch asked Hooks how the comments of Dr. Willie Gibson could be
interpreted as meaning anything other than a call for equal outcome. Senator
Hatch asked if requesting a districting plan providing blacks with the probabili-
ty of being elected in proportion to the population is anything but a call for
proportional representation. Hooks did not point out that America's long
history denying the vote to black citizens and the South's elaborate mechanisms
to evade the Fifteenth Amendment's mandate had made clear to many that the
only way to evaluate whether access was equal was to measure results. Hooks
did not explain that Willie Gibson represented a large percentage of voting
rights lawyers, and of the black population generally, who believe that equality
in voting means the creation of districts with enough of a black majority to
give black voters the potential to elect representatives of their choice. Instead,
he said, "I think there is a big difference between proportional representation
and representation in proportion to their population.""1 When Hatch asked
how you can tell the difference, Hooks responded, "We have never been able
to come up with any precise definition . . . . Like the Supreme Court Justice
said about pornography, 'I may not be able to define it, but I know it when
I see it.' . . . . [W]e know it when we see it in a given case."82 Not surpris-
ingly, this response did not satisfy Hatch, who continued to press, referring
Hooks to Gibson's other statement that thirty percent of the population should
have thirty percent of the representation. At this point, Hooks repudiated
Gibson's arguments altogether, responding that "there are many statements that
we make in the heat of battle out on the lines and in the trenches that do not
have anything to do with the results we seek."83
So concluded the debate. The drafters of the Voting Rights Amendments
had included a provision to institute an effects test and overturn the Supreme
Court's decision in Mobile v. Bolden. Through the course of the hearings the
opponents of the Amendments had vigorously criticized the effects test; more
importantly, they had criticized the vision of civil rights which provided the
theoretical underpinnings of the test. Forced to support their definition of civil
rights and equality, their claim that results are the best indicator of opportuni-
ty, and their decision to make race and racial consciousness a central feature
of all future legislative districting decisions, the supporters of the Voting Rights
Amendments conceded. They chose not to join the debate. When they did
81. Id. at 252.
82. Id. at 253.
83. Id. at 255.
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respond they avoided the fundamental civil rights questions which their legisla-
tion had placed on the table.
C. The Results
Despite the performance of the civil rights lobby, the Voting Rights
Amendments continued to advance through the Senate. There were a few
impediments. The bill suffered a temporary setback when the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee voted for a straightfor-
ward extension of the Act. This differed from the House bill and the Kennedy-
Mathias Senate bill principally in that the Subcommittee bill left intact the
intent test while the House bill and the Kennedy-Mathias bill instituted an
effects test." The Subcommittee vote was not surprising-it was chaired by
Senator Hatch and was composed of three conservative Republicans and two
Democrats. The vote was 3-2 along party lines. The true measure of the bill's
support would become clear when the full Committee on the Judiciary acted.
Meanwhile, the bill's supporters were having little success determining
President Reagan's position. After declining to take a position on the proposed
Amendments during the time the House bill was being debated, 5 then hinting
that he opposed the effects provision but was willing to negotiate,'4 Reagan
was still unforthcoming regarding whether he would sign the House version. 7
After postponing a vote on the bill, and while Senator Robert Dole attempt-
ed to work out a compromise that would ensure the support of the administra-
tion and key Senate Republicans, the Senate Judiciary Committee met to take
final action on the bill. 8 At mark-up, the Dole compromise was approved.
The compromise incorporated an effects test to be determined by the "totality
of the circumstances," added a stronger disclaimer clause-"nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population"-and placed a twenty-five
year cap on the preclearance requirement. In addition to accepting the compro-
mise, the Committee rejected a number of amendments, including one by
Senator East to amend the Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex
as well as race and color.89 While labeled a compromise, the decision was
truly a full victory for the civil rights coalition and its supporters.
84. Mary Thornton, White House Wins In Voting Rights Act Fight, WASH. POST, March 25, 1982,
at A5.
85. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 2.
86. Patricia Koza, Reagan Backs Extending Voting Rights Act, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov.
6, 1981 (AM cycle).
87. Voting Rights Hearings 1, supra note 16, at 396.
88. Steven V. Roberts, Panel Delays Action On Voting Rights Act As Compromise Is Sought, N.Y.
TIMES, April 28, 1982, at A25.
89. Voting Rights Hearings 11, supra note 34, at 102-05.
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The Administration had indicated it would agree to the compromise, so
there was little that could stop the bill." Still, some continued to oppose it.
Hatch had not been persuaded by the Dole compromise. As his fellow Subcom-
mittee members voted to accept it, he chastised them for "forsaking the great
historical goals of equal protection and a color-blind society and establishing
new goals in which racial balance and color-consciousness are primary," and
for giving "legal and constitutional sanction to a restoration of separate but
equal."91 Later, on the Senate floor, Hatch warned that "racial gerrymander-
ing and racial block voting will become normal occurrences" if the bill were
enacted. 92 East, sounding the themes he had emphasized during the hearings,
said that the bill would "introduce a quota concept" into elections. "The bone
of contention is," said East, "should we guarantee election results?""
Senator Jesse Helms provided the opposition with a spark of hope when
he threatened to filibuster "until the cows come home.""' However, the
filibuster lasted only six days; it ended when the Senate voted to invoke
cloture. The 86 to 8 vote for cloture was the largest ever recorded to limit
debate.9" While Helms could have continued delaying for some time after clo-
ture, at the urging of Senate Republicans, he did not. Helms had threatened
to delay further by attempting to add abortion rights and school prayer to the
debate. He had rallied pro-life forces to begin converging on the Hill when,
according to Dole, "a number of rather restless Republicans made it clear"
to Helms that they wanted to debate a voting rights bill unencumbered by
abortion amendments.s Helms "was apparently mollified by promises to take
up some of his pet projects later .... 9
The Senate then considered a number of amendments, the majority of them
aimed at weakening the Act.9" For example, East continued to try to eliminate
the effects provision, but his floor amendments were soundly defeated. The
Senate also defeated an East amendment that would have allowed courts in
addition to D. C. District Courts to hear bail-out requests, as well as one
90. In a letter to Senator Thurmond from Attorney General Smith, the Administration indicated that
Reagan would sign the Senate version, as modified by the Dole compromise. Smith wrote that "the express
provisions of the compromise amendment foreclose the possibility of an interpretation requiring proportional
representation." Voting Rights Hearings I1, supra note 34, at 119. The Administration adopted its
compromise stance under pressure from Congressional Republicans who believed that the Administration's
position was further alienating blacks and liberal whites. Steven V. Roberts, Senators Debate Voting Rights
Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1982, at A27.
91. Voting Rights Hearings IH. supra note 34, at 74.
92. Congress Extends 1965 Voting Rights Act; Senate Support Overwhelming, Facts On File World
Digest, June 25, 1982, at 450 F3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts File.
93. Id.
94. Mary Thornton, Helms Threatens to Stall Voting Rights Act, WASH. POST, June 10, 1982, at A12.
95. Congress Extends 1965 Voting Rights Act, supra note 92.
96. Joanne Omang, Senate Chokes Off Voting Rights Act Filibuster, 97-0, WASH. POST, June 18, 1982,
at A3.
97. Id.
98. Congress Extends 1965 Voting Rights Act, supra note 92.
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which would have shortened the life of the extension."
The bill was passed on June 18, 1982 by a 85-8 vote, with Senators
Thurmond and Hatch both voting in favor. Meanwhile, House leaders had
indicated that they would accept the Senate version in its entirety and send it
directly to President Reagan. Reagan, who had earlier indicated he would sign
the Senate version, hailed the vote as a "statesmanlike decision." 1 '
The civil rights community had gotten almost exactly the bill it requested.
In trying to explain the overwhelming success of the legislative struggle, many
lawmakers concluded "the vote was also a sign that the Voting Rights Act had
worked effectively and that lawmakers must respond to the growing power of
minority voters, even in the South."'01 According to Senator Mathias, the
floor manager of the bill, "[w]e said 17 years ago that the Voting Rights Act
would transform this country. Today we have evidence of that."" William
Taylor, a civil rights lawyer, concurred: "Clearly we couldn't have this kind
of vote before people were enfranchised."103 The statements of Mathias and
Taylor capture much of the celebratory mood which followed the passage of
the Amendments. The civil rights community was proud of its success and
delighted that its strength was acknowledged by the press, which ran headlines
such as "Voting Rights Act: Even Conservative Senate Heeds Civil-Rights
Groups. ""O
The observations of Mathias and Taylor and the confidence of the civil
rights leadership, while grounded in reality, tended to overstate the case. That
is, while bills like the Voting Rights Amendments were much more difficult
to pass before black voters were enfranchised, the act of enfranchisement
hardly guaranteed passage. However, the principal lesson they took from the
voting rights struggle was that they could prevail without providing a princi-
pled and coherent defense of the civil rights vision which supported their
legislative initiatives. The full meaning of this lesson would not become clear
until almost a decade later, when Congress considered the Civil Rights Acts
of 1990 and 1991.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1990 & 1991
As the civil rights leadership prepared to introduce the Civil Rights Act
of 1990, there were many reasons to be confident. First, Democrats controlled
99. Omang, supra note 96.
100. Steven V. Roberts, Voting Rights Act Renewed in Senate By Margin of 85-8, N.Y. TIMES, June




104. Julia Maher, Voting Rights Act: Even Conservative Senate Heeds Civil Rights Groups, CHPRwSLAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 21, 1982, at 15.
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both houses of Congress, which had not been the case in 1981 and 1982 when
Congress considered the Voting Rights Act. Second, the White House was
occupied by an individual who had indicated an interest in distancing himself
from the hostility towards civil rights issues that his predecessor had demon-
strated. Notwithstanding George Bush's campaign advertisements featuring
Willie Horton, many civil rights leaders, and a significant percentage of the
black population, believed that the promise of a kinder and gentler nation
would redound to their benefit. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the civil
rights community had demonstrated its ability to exert influence on Capitol Hill
throughout the 1980's, despite the conservative agenda which dominated that
decade. Civil rights organizations had lobbied effectively against the confirma-
tion of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court and for the Voting Rights Amend-
ments of 1982.
This part will examine the history of the Act, arguing that the civil rights
leadership failed to offer a coherent response to the conservative critique of
the Civil Rights Act and the vision of civil rights underlying it. Conservatives
assailed the Act on the grounds that it would lead to race-conscious preferenc-
es, undermine traditional definitions of merit, interfere with the managerial
prerogative of employers, and increase the role of federal courts in protecting
civil rights. Adopting the strategy used during the voting rights debate, the
civil rights leadership did not defend the legislation by explaining why each
of these results was necessary. Instead, it simply denied that the bill would
have these effects. Civil rights advocates thereby conceded what little ideolog-
ical terrain had not been already been appropriated by conservatives, further
impoverishing the civil rights discourse.
The negotiations over the proposed bill had a rocky start. Shortly after
introduction of the bill, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh distributed a
letter threatening that Bush would veto the bill unless significant changes were
made. 05 While Thornburg's letter identified a number of offending provi-
sions, the vast majority of the ensuing debate would focus on two issues. First,
in a case where a plaintiff has demonstrated that an employment practice (e.g.
a diploma requirement, standardized test, or height and weight requirement)
has the effect of discriminating against a protected class, what burden must
the employer meet to justify such a practice? In Griggs v. Duke Power, 'I
the Supreme Court held that "the [Civil Rights Act] proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited. "to Eighteen years later, the Supreme
105. WASH. POST, April 5, 1990, at A25.
106. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
107. Id. at 431.
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Court held, in Wards Cove v. Atonio,1°8 that an employer could meet the
business necessity standard by demonstrating that the "practice serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer."" ° In
response to Wards Cove, the Civil Rights bill proposed language that would
have required that an employer demonstrate that a practice was "essential to
effective job performance."1 ' Most of the debate turned on this language.
The second issue of importance was the attempt to add a damages remedy
to Title VII. While it has long been possible to recover monetary damages for
intentional racial discrimination under Section 1983, a reconstruction era
statute, Title VII had no damage provisions, meaning that a victim of intention-
al sex discrimination could not recover damages. The Civil Rights bill pro-
posed to change that by allowing damages under Title VII, which, unlike
Section 1983, covers sex discrimination as well as race discrimination.
A. The Conservative Critique
While much of the debate in Congress and the press was technical in
nature, the narrow issues were rarely discussed without some reference to
larger questions concerning the nature of civil rights, equality, and discrimina-
tion. As they had during the debate over the Voting Rights Amendments,
conservatives appeared aware that the debate over the Civil Rights Act would
be a debate over competing visions of equality. During the debate over the
Voting Rights Amendments conservatives had made clear that in their opinion
civil rights meant equal opportunity, equality meant color-blind, discrimination
meant evil motive, and federal courts were not needed. Although the employ-
ment context was different from the voting one, conservative Congressmen and
witnesses would sound many similar themes throughout the Civil Rights Act
hearings.
The primary criticism launched by conservatives concerned racial prefer-
ences. This criticism would be a central component of the opposition's argu-
ment. As one House Republican indicated, "much of the ensuing debate may
eventually turn on the proper role of preferential treatment based on race or
sex under our civil rights laws. " m Just as the Voting Rights bill contained
no provisions explicitly calling for electoral quotas, the Civil Rights bill
contained none demanding employment quotas. However, just as the opponents
of the Voting Rights bill had argued that the effects test would coerce govern-
108. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
109. Id. at 659.
110. Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 4000, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1990).
111. 1 The Civil Rights Act of 1990. Hearings on H.R. 4000 Before the House Comm. on Education
and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 20 (1990) [hereinafter House Civil Rights Hearings I I (statement of Rep.
Goodling).
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ments into redrawing boundaries to ensure proportional representation, the
opponents of the Civil Rights bill argued that its stringent language would force
employers into adopting quotas. Senator Hatch, again a key opposition figure,
argued that making an employer demonstrate the essential nature of a policy
with an adverse impact would "end up creating a situation where employers
are going to say, 'Gee, we don't want to fuss with this. We will just hire by
quota.'" 112 Representative Harris Fawell, one of the principal opponents on
the House side, argued that the employers' burden was so stringent that
employers will "come back and say we can't meet that kind of burden. If
you're going to throw that on us, we will opt out, take safe harbor, go with
quotas . . . ."' Similarly, conservative scholar Thomas Sowell indicated
that "the bottom line is that this law will make racial, sexual, and other group
quotas virtually inevitable for employers across the country."" 4
Race-based preferences were antithetical to the civil rights vision of the
bill's opponents. Racial preferences produced race consciousness in a society
which, in their view, needs to move beyond race. In the words of one senator:
"A truly color-blind society is not an unreachable ideal or outdated utopia,
existing only in naive civil rights rhetoric of the past. . . .It is the substance
of equal treatment under the law. Purchasing any goal, no matter how noble,
at the price of race-based preference is not compassion, it is injustice."1 5
Not only would racial preferences move society further away from the color-
blind goal, they would produce racial animosity and victimize the supposed
beneficiaries because affirmative action "engenders resentment and insults
those who refuse to be patronized." 6
The bill's opponents also claimed that race-based preferences were antithet-
ical to a meritocracy. James Paras, for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
testified that the bill would "substitut[e] quotas for merit. "17 Assistant Attor-
ney General Donald Ayer indicated that "[w]e are much more worried about
the unfairness to everybody out there who wants a job and most of all, wants
to be judged on their own merit, on their own abilities."11
While preserving a meritocracy was an important principle in and of itself,
it took an a sharper edge when the bill's opponents indicated that if the meri-
tocracy were disturbed, the losers would be innocent white men. One such
victim testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Jim Henson, a
112. Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Civil Rights Hearings].
113. House Civil Rights Hearings 1, supra note 111, at 222. See also id. at 361 (testimony of Donald
Ayers, Dep. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice).
114. Thomas Sowell, Risky Dogma of Disparate Impact (on file with author).
115. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 541 (statement of Senator Coats).
116. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 541 (statement of Senator Coats).
117. Id. at 283.
118. House Civil Rights Hearings I, supra note 111, at 388.
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white Birmingham firefighter and a plaintiff in Martin v. Wilks, 9 testified
that he had been wronged by an affirmative action plan. While the testimony
focused on the provision that attempted to limit a nonbeneficiary's ability to
attack an affirmative action plan, 20 the testimony came to stand for much
more. Henson explained that pursuant to an affirmative action program, he was
turned down for a promotion. The spot was given to a black man who had less
experience, less education, and a lower score on the exam. In fact, asserted
Henson, out of 100 people who took the test, he scored sixth, while Carl
Cook, the black who received the promotion, scored eighty-fifth. 1 2 Follow-
ing Henson's testimony, he had the following exchange with Senator Hatch:
Sen. Hatch: [T]o be replaced by somebody else, regardless of color or whatever,
who was No. 85, that was pretty hard to take wasn't it?
Mr. Henson: It was very hard to take, Senator.
Sen. Hatch: And especially since he did not have the 2 years of education that you
had with regard to firefighting, right?
Mr. Henson: Right, yes, sir.
Sen. Hatch: And he didn't have some of the other training that you had.
Mr. Henson: That's correct. I felt that obviously I was denied an opportunity
because this consent decree puts more emphasis on racial issues, or on the race
of the applicant, than on qualification. And I didn't-
Sen. Hatch: And you didn't care about race yourself.
Mr. Henson: I wasn't concerned about that.
Sen. Hatch: In other words, if he were No. 6 and you were No. 85, you'd expect
him to get the job, right, or the promotion?
Mr. Henson: That's true, that's certainly true. I would have had no objections at
all, and didn't to those who were higher on the list than myself ....
Sen. Hatch: [W]hen they told you that they were going to enter a consent decree,
or they were going to litigate to try and resolve discrimination matters, you
119. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
120. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77 (1992).
121. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 385.
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thought that was a good idea, didn't you?
Mr. Henson: That's correct. I did not realize that they were going to resolve
discrimination by discriminating against me."
Jim Henson's testimony was referred to frequently by the bill's opponents.
His testimony came to symbolize the manner in which affirmative action
victimizes innocent whites. As one witness testified, "there comes a time in
our society where . . . the innocents are the victims. At some point we have
to balance that again. We can't keep treading on those people who had nothing
to do with it."" Representative Fawell spoke for many of the bill's oppo-
nents when he concluded, "I guess [white males are] the only ones that aren't
a protected class anymore."'124
While the opposition's attack on the bill centered on the question of racial
preferences, the opponents did not rest there. The second important criticism
of the bill was that it would restrict an employer's freedom to make business
decisions. Harvard Law Professor Charles Fried, a key opposition witness,
said "the thing that troubles me is that by talking about essentiality, you are
telling every business, nonprofit organization, school, museum, hospital, that
the Courts will decide what the essential way to run their business is ....
And I think that is very serious. That is a very serious intrusion."" z Law-
rence Lorber, testifying for the National Association of Manufacturers, indicat-
ed that the companies he represented opposed congressional interference with
their business practices: "I don't believe any of the employers I represent
would willingly want to have an industrial psychologist standing behind every
supervisor when that supervisor is filling out a performance appraisal to make
sure that the [appraisal] comports with some psychologist's notions of fair-
ness. "126
The criticism that the Civil Rights Act unduly impinged on managerial
prerogative was closely linked to the criticism that it mandated race-based
employment preferences. The bill's opponents opposed race-based employment
preferences for several reasons. Opponents believed that preferences disadvan-
taged whites and imposed restraints on an employer's business and personnel
prerogative. At the same time, they opposed interfering with an employer's
prerogative both because it subjected the employer's hiring and promotion
122. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 537.
123. 2 The Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 4000 Before the House Comm. on Education
and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 643 (1990) [hereinafter House Civil Rights Hearings 11] (testimony of Gerald
Smetana, Esq., Abraham & Fox).
124. Id. at 446.
125. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 87.
126. House Civil Rights Hearings 1, supra note 111, at 720.
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practices to increased scrutiny and because it coerced employers into hiring
greater numbers of minorities and women. The link between the argument
against quotas and the argument against interfering with employers' prerogative
was illustrated by Charles Fried's assertion that "[n]ow, I know that the
proponents of this bill find that forcing quotas on employers who are innocent
of any wrong . . . is as deplorable as I do and as the American people
do. "
127
The opposition's final objection to the Civil Rights Act concerned the
provision for damage awards for intentional sexual discrimination. The bill's
opponents argued that this provision would lead to larger numbers of civil
rights claims, with more plaintiffs winning larger damage awards. The targets
of the criticism were lawyers, who, the bill's opponents alleged, would en-
courage plaintiffs to press charges in the hopes of winning a large damage
award. David Maddux, testifying for the National Retail Federation, the retail
industry's principal trade and lobbying organization, argued that California's
experience with compensatory and punitive damages for employment discrimi-
nation has produced a situation where employment discrimination litigation has
become driven by the plaintiffs lawyers who are "in turn driven by hopes of
a large jury verdict, large punitive damage verdict, and a contingent fee
coming into their pocket."128 In a similar vein, the Chamber of Commerce
asserted that "the prime and perhaps only beneficiaries of the bill would be
the lawyers who would reap potentially vast monetary rewards from expanded
incentives for litigation which the bill provides."129 The bill's opponents
estimated that the damage provisions would triple the cost of Title VII litigation
from .775 billion dollars to 2 billion dollars.130 Lawyers would not be the
only ones to benefit from the litigation bonanza. Assistant Attorney General
Donald Ayer said the act would create a "bonanza not only for lawyers but
also for plaintiffs."'31
Moreover, argued the bill's opponents, Title VII was intended to encourage
conciliation through administrative agencies, not litigation in federal courts.
"When the Congress enacted Title VII, it wanted rapid resolution of employ-
ment concerns," Lorber argued. "It wanted minorities and women on the job,
not languishing in the courts," he contended. He concluded that "there was
no thought then of creating a national employment lottery where individuals,
indeed aggrieved individuals, would await their turn to get into hopelessly
crowded courts for a chance at a windfall while they give up the job or
127. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 69 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 196.
129. Id. at 283 (testimony of James Paras).
130. 3 The Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 4000 Before the House Conn. on Education
and Labor, 101st Cong. 2nd Sess. 3 [hereinafter House Civil Rights Hearings III ] (testimony of Edward
Potter, Nat'l Foundation for the Study of Equal Employment Policies).
131. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 110.
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promotion they actually wanted."' 2 The final component of the anti-litigation
argument was that federal courts would be overburdened by the increased
litigation the damage provisions would engender. Under the bill, a high
percentage of the 40,000 complaints the E.E.O.C. received in 1989 would land
in federal court: "It is crystal clear that neither the [E.E.O.C.] nor the Judicia-
ry are presently equipped to handle the onslaught of additional cases that
plaintiffs certainly will pursue in hopes of winning a big jury award."133
As they had during the voting rights debate, the Civil Rights Act's oppo-
nents made explicit their objection to the proposed bill. They rejected race-
based preferences, limits on an employer's prerogative, and expanded judicial
oversight. In sum, as they had during the battle over the Voting Rights Amend-
ments, the bill's opponents completely rejected the vision of civil rights
underlying the Civil Rights Act.
B. The Proponents Respond
If the opposition's tactics were similar during the debates over the two
legislative initiatives, the approach of the supporters was even more similar.
The civil rights leadership argued in 1982 that Mobile v. Bolden 34 had
changed the law and the Voting Rights Amendments were a restoration; in
1990 it argued that Wards Cove changed the law and the Civil Rights Act
would simply change it back. According to John Jacob, the Civil Rights bill
"restores the status quo that existed before the Supreme Court's regressive
rulings."135 Moreover, the proponents argued, just as voting rights law
before Mobile had not produced proportional representation, employment law
before Wards Cove had not produced quotas: "I know of no employer who has
been forced to adopt a quota because of the Griggs decision." 136 While the
132. Id. at 208. See also House Civil Rights Hearings 1, supra note 111, at 715-716 (testimony of
Lawrence Lorber); House Civil Rights Hearings 11, supra note 123, at 87 (testimony of Victor Schacter).
133. House Civil Rights Hearings 11, supra note 123, at 89 (testimony of Victor Schachter). The two
parts of the anti-litigation argument seem like an odd match. On the one hand, the argument runs, the court
system should not be open to plaintiffs attempting to exact large damage awards from employers. Alterna-
tively, there are not enough courts to handle the cases. However put, the upshot of the opposition argument
was, in the words of one of the bill's opponents, "[tihe path to equal employment does not run through
the courthouse door." Adams Clymer, Battle Over Civil Rights Emphasizes Sexual Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
MARCH 4, 1991, AT A14 (quoting Zachary Fasman).
134. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
135. House Civil Rights Hearings 1, supra note 111, at 591; see also Senate Civil Rights Hearings,
supra note 112, at 14 (testimony of William Coleman, O'Melveny & Myers).
136. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 183 (testimony of Hon. William Brown III,
Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis); see also id. at 50 (testimony of William Coleman, O'Melveny &
Myers), House Civil Rights Hearings 11, supra note 123, at 580-81, (testimony of Alfred Blumrosen,
Professor, Rutgers Law School), House Civil Rights Hearings 117, supra note 130, at 355 (testimony of
Ben Reyes, Houston City Council).
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bill's opponents conceded that the Griggs standard was acceptable, 137 they
maintained that the bill did not return the law to Griggs. According to Hatch,
"whether or not Griggs has led employers in the past to use quotas is totally
irrelevant to this bill. This bill does not codify Griggs. It twists Griggs com-
pletely out of shape."'
38
Just as the voting rights debate was not resolved by fighting over whether
Mobile changed the law, the civil rights debate would not be resolved by
haggling over whether the bill was a restoration of Griggs. All the parties
understood that more fundamental questions were at stake. The civil rights
leadership agreed with the analysis of one of the bill's opponents, who re-
marked "if the issue is drawn as quotas, we win . . . . If the issue is drawn
as civil rights, we lose."' 39 The opposition had done its job in drawing the
issue as quotas. Accordingly, the bill's supporters worked desperately to rebut
the opposition's quota charges. For example, when Attorney General Richard
Thornburg characterized the bill as a "quota bill," Ben Hooks wrote a letter
to Representative Augustus Hawkins, Chairman of the Committee on Education
and Labor, saying "this bill has nothing to do with quotas and it is irrespon-
sible and divisive to make such statements."" 4
It was not enough, however, simply to reject the quota charges. The
opposition had not merely asserted that the bill would produce quotas. It had
crafted a full-fledged assault on race-based preferences. It provided a vision
of civil rights that failed to include or allow for such preferences, explained
how the bill's logic would encourage such preferences, and pointed to the Jim
Henson's of the world as examples of the evil such preferences could produce.
Unfortunately, rather than attempt to respond to this critique, the bill's support-
ers backpedaled. In their haste to say the bill did not require quotas, the civil
rights leadership repudiated affirmative action generally. John Jacob, for
example, said, "[a]nother misleading critique of this bill is the suggestion that
it is an affirmative action bill.""' He did not attempt to draw a distinction
between permissible and impermissible racial preferences programs. 42 Rev.
Jesse Jackson tried an alternative approach, arguing that affirmative action had
no costs: "[A]ffirmative action does not negate whites . . . ."'
137. See, e.g., Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 234 (testimony of David Maddux,
Esq., Shepard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton).
138. Id. at 240.
139. Veto-ready: Bush v. Revised CivilRights Act, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 11, 1990, at 12 (quoting
Patrick McGuigan of the Free Congress Center for Law and Democracy).
140. Letter from Ben Hooks, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to Augustus Hawkins, Chairman,
Comm. on Education and Labor (Apr. 23, 1990) (on file with author).
141. House Civil Rights Hearings 1, supra note 111, at 591.
142. Sholom Comay, President of the American Jewish Comm., did attempt to draw such a distinction.
While the AJC opposes quotas, "we believe very strongly in affirmative action," with goals and timetables
as opposed to rigid numerical formulas. Id. at 201.
143. Major Garrett, Civil Rights Act Vote Set For Mandela 's Day; GOP Miffed, WASH. TES, June
25, 1990, at 10 (quoting Jesse Jackson).
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The rejection and obfuscation of affirmative action indicated by these
statements is startling and problematic.'" First, the notion that the legacy
of Title VII and Griggs was not a legacy of affirmative action is certainly
wrong. Legal scholars and employment discrimination lawyers have long
believed that the logic of Griggs supported affirmative action. In fact, the rea-
soning of affirmative actions supporters in the 1970's is almost identical to that
of its opponents in 1990. As one left-of-center scholar concluded writing in
the 1970's, the "third outstanding feature of Griggs is that it virtually coerces
employers . . . into adoption of affirmative action programs.'145 Because a
prima facie case can only be established with a showing of disparate impact,
"a potential defendant who wishes to avoid litigation, or who wishes to avoid
the adoption of different or more cumbersome selection procedures, need only
negate the disproportionate impact by adopting different procedures for the
minority groups disproportionately excluded.' In sum, "Griggs implicitly
offers a choice: either make the meritocracy work on its own terms or make
up for its flaws through affirmative efforts.""'
Given this interpretation of the logic of Griggs, it is not surprising that one
corporate attorney testified that ninety percent of his clients "currently engage
in some form of quota selection processes . ". . . ' This understanding of
Griggs also explains why a study conducted by the Conference on Mayors
found that 136 of 153 cities had equal opportunity or affirmative action pro-
grams.149 The survey also found that these cities had thoroughly revamped
their hiring and promotion practices: testing or screening procedures had been
changed in one half of the cities; hiring procedures had been changed in over
half of the cities; promotion procedures had been changed in 32 % of the cities,
and affirmative action goals and timetables for hiring minorities and women
had been established in 72% of the cities.' 50 Furthermore, the study found
that the affirmative action policies had been well received. Officials in 93 %
of the cities believed that the results of the plans were positive, while only two
cities reported that the programs had a negative effect.' Of course, the
144. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Saving Affirmative Action, THE NATION, Dec. 6, 1991, at 756.
145. Alan David Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law, 62
Minn. L. Rev. 1049, 1099 (1978).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. House Civil Rights Hearings I, supra note 123, at 625 (testimony of Glen Nager).
149. See Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 265 (testimony of Bill Hudnut, Mayor of
Indianapolis). Hudnut provided a rare defense of affirmative action. He asserted that "[m]ost mayors
support ... affirmative action programs" because they believe "that without positive, proactive Government
action, there will be very little change." Id. at 264. According to Hudnut, "[tihe system will not correct
itself. If we don't have policies in both the public and private sectors which provide opportunities for
women and minorities, the unfortunate fact of the matter is that they will continue to be excluded and white
males will be favored in the hiring and promoting decisions." Id. at 266. For additional evidence of the
impact of Griggs on affirmative action see Gertrude Ezorsky, Racism and Justice, 38-41, 48-49 (1991).
150. Id. at 268.
151. Id. at 268-69.
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overall success and acceptance of these programs does not alone justify
Jackson's assertion that affirmative action does not negate whites. As Jim
Henson or Alan Bakke could aptly explain, affirmative action does have losers.
That doesn't make it unjustifiable, but it certainly makes it unjustifiable on the
grounds that it harms nobody.
As noted in Part I, a close link existed between opposition to the bill on
the grounds that it would require race-based preferences and the grounds that
it would intrude on an employer's right to control the workplace. The response
of the bill's supporters to the two arguments was also related. Just as the civil
rights leadership failed to defend race-based preferences in their response to
the opposition's quota charges, so too did they reject the notion that the Civil
Rights Act would interfere with an employers managerial prerogative.
The supporters' principal response to criticism that the bill would interfere
with an employer's right to control his workplace was that the bill would be
good for business. First, the supporters argued, antidiscrimination laws had
historically enabled business to "make more profit" and be "more productive,"
because "they have been forced to hire and promote people based on real
qualifications and the real important elements of the job."152 According to
William Coleman, a key supporter of the bill, large corporations liked anti-
discrimination laws.153 The bill's supporters also argued that employment
discrimination hurt productivity. Particularly in light of the increasing competi-
tiveness of the world market and America's changing demographics, they
argued, the nation could no longer afford to ignore the potential of its female
and minority workers. "[T]he elimination of discrimination is an absolute
necessity," for America to "reestablish our competitive position in the
world. ""' Moreover, "we are not likely to be able to develop our people,
our women and minorities, as long as we permit discrimination and unless we
make the most effective use of people who will be the largest, overwhelming
proportion of the growth of our workforce. "15 Restoring America's competi-
tive position would help big business, as well as the nation as a whole. As one
congressman argued, "not only women and minorities are the beneficiaries of
the civil rights laws. The Nation benefits even more. . . .85 out of every 100
members of the work force by the year 2000 will be women and minorities.
It only makes sense, therefore, that we offer women and minorities fair
152. House Civil Rights Hearings III, supra note 130, at 160-61 (testimony of Kerry Scanlon, Esq.,
NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
153. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 50.
154. Id. at 41 (testimony ofF. Ray Marshall, professor, LBJ School of Pub. Affairs, Univ. of Texas).
155. Id.
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opportunity in every way. " "'
The bill's supporters were not fazed by the tension between their argument
that the changing nature of the world economy and the American workforce
would make antidiscrimination an even greater economic imperative and the
fact that business groups and corporate America overwhelmingly opposed the
law. As Professor F. Ray Marshall explained, it was necessary to have a civil
rights law to induce employers to do something which was in their economic
interest. "The reason that this legislation is important is you can't expect
employers necessarily to do what is in even their own interest to do," he said.
"And I think one of the main reasons for us having legislation is to be able
to remove a lot of social barriers and to create a climate to make it possible
for employers to do what is in their own interest to do.""5 7 Notwithstanding
one or two attempts by a Congressman or witness to argue that restraining
business was a necessary element of employment discrimination law,' the
overwhelming position of the civil rights leadership was that profit maximiza-
tion was a worthy goal, one which the Civil Rights Act would help produce.
The third prong of the opposition's assault on the bill's civil rights vision
concerned the role of the courts. The bill's opponents argued that raising the
burden an employer must meet to rebut a prima facie case and providing for
damages for intentional sex discrimination would encourage more people to
file civil rights suits. They argued that this increased caseload would further
federal judiciary oversight upon the employer-employee relationship. In
response, the civil rights leadership chose not to argue that litigation had been
and would continue to be one of the principal mechanisms used by minorities
and women to remedy wrongs or that federal court oversight of the relationship
between employers and employees was necessary and desirable. Instead, the
bill's supporters argued that litigation was not central to their vision of civil
rights.
This argument had two components. First, the bill's supporters argued that
historically individuals brought very few employment discrimination cases.
Antonia Hernandez, President of the Mexican-American Legal Defense and
Education Fund, asserted that litigants had great difficulty finding lawyers in
private practice who would take their cases because the cases are often com-
plex and expensive. 59 Another witness testified that when the Civil Rights
156. House Civil Rights Hearings I, supra note 111, at 26 (statement of Rep. Donald Payne).
Similarly, William Brown, former Chair of EEOC, referred to a study prepared by the Hudson Institute
which argued for the economic necessity of incorporating women and minorities into the workforce. Id.
at 504-05. See also id. at 591 (testimony of John Jacobs, president, National Urban League).
157. Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 112, at 48.
158. See, e.g., id. at 273 (testimony of Robert Abrams, Attorney General, New York. Abrams noted
that "[clertainly passage of the bill would preserve burdens that some employers would prefer to escape.
But if those burdens are the cost of justice and progress, then they are well worth bearing." Id. See also
House Civil Rights Hearings 11, supra note 123 at 188. (testimony of Rep. Craig Washington).
159. House Civil Rights Hearings I, supra note 111, at 612-13.
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Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 was being considered, many thought it
would encourage litigation. However, in the eight years following the passage
of the Act, civil rights claims of the type covered by the Act dropped as a
percent of the federal docket by 31%. In fact, the witness claimed, only 3.9%
of those who believe they are victims of employment discrimination ever file
suit. "6
The second component of the supporters' argument was that even when
victims of discrimination sue for damages, they recover very little. The bill's
supporters made repeated reference to a study which examined every Section
1981 suit brought in the 1980's and found that plaintiffs prevailed in only 118
out of 576 (20%).161 Moreover, the court awarded damages in only 68 of
those victories. 162 In 1987, the average award was slightly under $40,000
and only three awards exceeded $200,000. 163
While there was an occasional defender of the litigation process, 61 the
civil rights leadership largely repudiated litigation. Rather than defending
federal court litigation as a mechanism for civil rights enforcement, the bill's
supporters stressed the futility of the litigation process. This strategy was
especially startling given the centrality of litigation to the Civil Rights Act, as
well as the opposition's denunciation of court interference. However, the
decision not to forcefully defend the role of litigation as a central element in
the fight for equal employment opportunity is less surprising when viewed in
light of the leadership's approach to the questions of race-based preferences
and restraining business' decisionmaking authority. Perhaps imitating its
successful strategy during the Voting Rights Act, the civil rights leadership
believed it could get the bill it desired without responding to the conservative
critique and without advancing an alternative civil rights vision.
C. Racial Politics
The problems created by the civil rights leadership's failure to respond
forcefully to the conservative critique of the bill were compounded as Republi-
cans began to realize they could reap political benefits from opposing the Civil
Rights Act. While early press reports indicated that opposition to a civil rights
160. House Civil Rights Hearings 11, supra note 123, at 137-38 (testimony of Prof. Ted Eisenberg,
Cornell Law School).
161. See, e.g., House Civil Rights Hearings IIl, supra note 130, at 60 (testimony of Ellen Vargyas,
attorney, National Women's Law Center).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 66.
164. See, e.g. House Civil Rights Hearings I, supra note 111, at 419. (statement of Representative
Hawkins: "I would agree with you that it is possible that a proposal of this nature may increase litigation.
However, I say, as between the litigation and whether or not a person has a right to have their civil rights
protected and to secure sufficient remedy for it [sic], including damages, monetary damages for it, I think
that is a risk we run.")
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measure would constitute a political liability for Bush, over the summer
increasing numbers of Congressmen, lobbyists, and reporters were beginning
to discuss the political gains that could result from opposition to the Civil
Rights Act. 65 Democratic political strategist Robert Beckel noted, "It's in
the best interests of the Democrats to have Bush sign this bill" to prevent the
Republican party from "playing the race card."'
Liberal congressmen admitted that the Civil Rights Act could serve to drive
white voters further away from the Democratic party. "There is a perception
on the part of whites-working-class whites, ethnic groups, white Southern-
ers-that the Democratic Party is the party of the blacks," said Representative
John Lewis. "I think there is in some cases a perception that blacks are taking
jobs away ...making it impossible for white males, working-class whites,
to advance, to be promoted. "167 Moreover, pollster Stan Greenberg conduct-
ed a series of focus groups in working-class white suburbs and found a well-
spring of hostility toward the Democratic party for favoring blacks. "The
special status of blacks is perceived by almost all these individuals as a serious
obstacle to their personal advancement. "168
At the same time, conservatives reminded the President that a veto was
very important to them. According to Republican political strategist Clint
Bolick, "I think that Bush can not only get away with the [veto], but at this
point he has much more to worry about on his right flank than on his left. This
bill is a litmus test for conservatives. "1619 Some believed that Bush owed it
to his conservative white support to veto the bill. One administration official
argued that "[Bush] ought to go with the veto because we have expended all
165. See, e.g., Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Race Remains A Factor In U.S. Politics, 22
NATIONAL JOURNAL 1621 (1990).
166. Thomas B. Edsall, Civil Rights Bill May Hold Piofalls For Democrats, WASH. PosT, July 23,
1990, at AS.
167. Id.
168. Id. One did not need to participate in a focus group to encounter the type of hostility to which
Greenberg referred. USA Today ran a column which was ostensibly a criticism of the Civil Rights bill;
however, the author's real theme was that frequent complaints by blacks regarding racism could not stand
up in light of the favored status granted blacks.
Society's overwhelming abhorrence of race prejudice against minorities is graphic: Al Campanis,
Jimmy the Greek Snyder and Andy Rooney are ostracized or sanctioned for racially derogatory
remarks. Politician David Duke is shunned by the Republican Party. Bill Cosby and Oprah
Winfrey earn nationwide kudos and fortunes. Miss America, the House Democratic whip and
the chairman of the Democratic National Committee and the chief justice of the Florida Supreme
Court are black. Tawana Brawley's fabrication of rape by white policemen is indulged until
thoroughly discredited. Hundreds of laws give racial minorities preferences in college admissions,
public employment and contracting.
According to this writer, rather than request further protection, blacks should recognize they are already
the law's special favorite. Bruce Fein, This Civil Rights Law Creates Discrimination, USA TODAY, April
10, 1990, at 10A.
169. Andrew Rosenthal, House Passes Rights Bill On Job Bias; White House Vows Veto, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1990, at D25.
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our efforts to get new voters into the coalition [and] for once we ought to do
something to keep what we've got, the Reagan Democrats. These are the
issues, the social issues, that brought them to us. "170
Over the course of the legislative session, supporters of the bill began to
sense that the game of racial politics was being played, and that they would
be the losers. Columnist William Raspberry complained bitterly that "[Bush],
sir, you appear to be using 'quotas' the way you used Willie Horton during
your campaign: as a coded message to the bigots who oppose the very things
you say you want to achieve."171 Columnist Dorothy Gilliam argued that
Bush's retrograde position on civil rights emboldened David Duke to come to
Capitol Hill and take credit for helping defeat the legislation, while Duke's
success running on a white supremacy campaign encouraged George Bush to
believe that he too could win votes by opposing the demands of blacks and
women. 172
D. The Results
The House Committee on Education and Labor passed H.R.4000 by a vote
of 23 to 10 on May 8, 1990. The revised bill contained significant compromise
language intended to defuse the quota issue. However, President Bush still
argued that the bill was a quota bill and said simply, "I will not sign a quota
bill. "173 Similarly, Attorney General Thornburgh said that the compromise
language did not address the White House's concerns because it "would still
permit the quota camel to get its nose under the tent in an indirect way." 74
The Administration's position hardened over the summer. Even Vice-President
Dan Quayle joined the debate: "The Administration is not going to have a
quota bill crammed down its throat disguised as a civil rights bill."'75
In the fall, the Administration made clear that the two sides were too far
apart to achieve a compromise. On October 12, Chief of Staff John Sununu
presented a proposed substitute bill that would have allowed employers to
defend practices with a discriminatory impact on the grounds of "community
or customer relations." However, as civil rights advocates were quick to point
out, phrases such as Sununu's were code words that had been struck down by
courts when the airlines used them to justify restricting flight attendant jobs
170. Anne Devroy & Michael Isikoff, Compromise Seen Possible On Rights Act; Key GOP Supporters
Confer With Bush In Attempt To Avoid Veto, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1990, at Al.
171. William Raspberry, Sign The Civil Rights Bill. WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1990, at All.
172. Dorothy Gilliam, Playing To The Worst In Americans, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1990, at C3.
173. Anne Devroy & Shawn LaFraniere, Bush Outlines Objection To Civil Rights Proposal; President
Says He Won't Sign Quota Bill, WASH. POST., May, 18, 1990, at A6.
174. Id.
175. Steven A. Holmes, Accord Is Sought On Rights Measure To Avoid A Veto, N. Y. TiMES, July
20, 1990, at A10.
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to young, single women. 176
The battle lines had been drawn, and the bill's supporters in the Senate and
the House attempted to achieve sufficient votes to override a presidential veto.
The Senate approved the bill on October 16, 1990, but the 62-34 vote was 5
short of the 67 needed to override a veto. 1" The House approved the bill
on Oct. 17, 1990, but the 273-154 vote was seventeen short of the 290 needed
to override.178 One week later President Bush vetoed the bill, arguing that
"despite the use of the term 'civil rights' in the title of S. 2104, the bill
actually employs a maze of highly legalistic language to introduce the destruc-
tive use of quotas into our nation's employment system."179
The ensuing Senate override effort fell one vote short-66 to 34, with all
55 Democrats, joined by 11 Republicans, voting to override."80 The Civil
Rights Act of 1990 had been defeated.
E. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The rhetorical positioning on the Civil Rights Act had taken place by the
conclusion of the 1990 debate. 1991 largely consisted of both sides restating
their positions while jockeying for advantage and waiting for a breakthrough
in the legislative logjam. For their part, the bill's opponents continued to argue
that the legislation constituted an endorsement of quotas, " exacerbated racial
and ethnic differences, encouraged needless litigation,"' and discouraged
176. Ethan Bronner, Bush Vows to Veto Civil Rights Legislation, Boston Globe, Oct. 13, 1990, at
4.
177. Tom Kenworthy, House Approves Civil Rights Bill; Despite Changes, Veto Threat Stands, WASH.
PoST, Oct. 18, 1990, at Al.
178. Id.
179. Frank J. Mcrory and Jennings Moss, Bush Vetoes Rights Bill, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990,
at Al.
180. Neil A. Lewis, President's Veto of Rights Measure Survives By I Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25,
1990, at Al.
181. Even after the introduction of compromise legislation, Clint Bolick said, "I've heard nothing
recently that changes the picture. The bill, as it has been reported, remains a quota bill, and the President
won't sign a quota bill." Democratic Civil Rights Package Expected To Bar Hiring Quotas, L.A. TIMES,
May 21, 1991, at A25. Rep. Henry Hyde agreed, noting, "You can say this isn't a quota bill ... but you
know if you take a bottle of muscatel and put a label on it that says Cordon Rouge 1812, it's still a bottle
of muscatel." Jennings Moss, New Rights Bill In House, WASH. TIMES, May 22, 1991, at Al. Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh said, "I haven't seen the [Democratic] legislation yet, but it clearly does not
cure the defects in the legislation that prompted the President to express his opposition to it earlier on the
basis that it would pressure employers into adopting quotas . . . ." Thomas B. Edsall, Insurance Against
the Q Word: Democratic Consultants Feel Civil Rights Strategy May Work, WASH. POST, May 23, 1991,
at A31. President Bush agreed: "It's a quota bill, no matter how the authors dress it up. You can't put a
sign on a pig and say it's a horse." Martin Schram, Bush Is Jogging on the Racial Low Road, NEWSDAY,
June 5, 1991, at 101.
182. According to Rep. Hyde, the Democrats' bill would "institutionalize color, ethnic and gender
preferences under the false flag of civil rights." If the bill were enacted, he would "recommend all help-
wanted signs revert to the old 'Irish need not apply' signs in 19th century Boston, and perhaps advertise-
ments can specify: 'Help wanted: four women, two African-American males, and one Hispanic required.'"
Tom Kenworthy, House Clears Wayfor Vote on Civil Rights Bill, Alternative Measures DecisivelyDefeated,
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minorities from achieving the necessary qualifications through education."'
The bill's proponents continued to assert that the legislation would not
produce quotas, l"' increase damage awards," 6 or foster an adverse eco-
nomic climate."8 7 However, the brunt of the proponent's attack was on the
President and his use of racial politics. According to Peter Edelman, law
professor at Georgetown University Law Center, "I think [the Bush administra-
tion] sees a politics they can play into, appealing to the lowest common
denominator. It gets them votes and keeps people from focusing on their lack
of a domestic policy. It is sheer demagoguery."' Congressman Richard
Gephardt agreed: "Who can forget some of the tactics of the 1988 campaign?
Or the veto of the Civil Rights Act? Or the Jesse Helms smear campaign that
libeled the Civil Rights Act with the label of a 'quota bill'?" Gephardt conclud-
ed, "The President is attempting to exploit working people's fear of losing
their jobs in order to justify pitting white working people against black working
people. As we enter the 1992 campaign, the President who preaches racial
harmony is practicing racial division."89
WASH. POST, June 5, 1991, at Al.
183. According to Bush, "The Democratic bill invites people to litigate, not cooperate. This is no way
to promote harmony." House Civil Rights Law Should Be Law, USA TODAY, June 5, 1991, at 12A.
184. Use of disparate impact analysis in employment discrimination law has "removed incentives for
minority children to achieve well in schools .... [M]inority youth have little incentive to discipline
themselves to acquire a high school diploma, if employers hiring for an entry-level job cannot require one
for fear of having 'disparate impact' litigation brought against them." Evan Kemp, To Measure Up In the
World; Educating To Even the Odds, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at GI (article by chairman of
E.E.O.C.).
185. House Speaker Thomas Foley said, "The President is incorrect; this is not a quota bill." John
Dillin, Rights Leader Rips Bush Tactics, CHRISTIAN SC. MON., June 6, 1991, at 6.
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Unlike the bill's opponents, who could be content with restating arguments,
it was clear to the civil rights lobby that it would have to change its tactics to
avoid another legislative defeat. The leadership chose a series of compromise
tactics, most of which involved the further repudiation of a civil rights vision
already seriously compromised in the 1990 debates. The fundamental premise
from which the civil rights lobby appeared to operate was that it could only
answer the Republicans' quota charge by outflanking the conservatives from
the right. That is to say, the civil rights lobby and its congressional allies
would insulate themselves from charges of endorsing race-based preferences
by abandoning public endorsement of such preferences and by lacing the bill
with anti-affirmative action provisions.
The first step that civil rights leaders took in distancing themselves from
racial preferences was an attempt to distance themselves from race. This
entailed renaming the bill the "Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employ-
ment Act," an attempt to focus attention on gender, and away from race.'"
As one columnist concluded, "This bill is not about race. It's about paying
working wives and women heading households what they ought to be
paid."191 In a second step, civil rights advocates placed a provision in the
bill limiting "race-norming." 92 In "race-norming," the federal government,
in an effort to remedy the fact that blacks and Hispanics score lower as a
group than whites and Asians, boosts the scores of black and Hispanic test-
takers.'93 Opponents of affirmative action, buoyed by their success in label-
ling the bill a "quota" bill, had broadened their attack in 1991, introducing
measures to ban race-norming in federal standardized testing. While some civil
rights advocates indicated a desire to defend race-norming on the merits, 94
the civil rights lobby chose to avoid the issue by introducing an anti-race
norming provision in the bill, stealing the conservatives' thunder. In a third
step, civil rights advocates inserted language into the bill indicating that quotas
were "not encouraged, required, or permitted."195 Finally, the civil rights
lobby agreed to relax the standard by which an employer could justify the use
190. Steven A. Holmes, House Leaders Push Weakened Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1991, at
17.
191. Judy Mann, Women as Beneficiaries, WASH. POST, May 22, 1991, at C3. See also Judy Mann,
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at 66.
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of a discriminatory hiring standard, an issue which had long been a critical
element of the opponent's claim regarding quotas.
These concessions were included in the compromise proposal unveiled by
the Democrats in May. 196 Yet, the civil rights lobby quickly learned that its
modifications were unlikely to make much difference in terms of garnering
additional support. The Democrats wanted to add to the 273 votes garnered
in the House in 1990, with the goal of getting the 290 votes necessary for a
veto override. But many congressmen indicated that their votes would not
change. "I think the bill does indirectly call for quotas," said Representative
Ed Jenkins. "It does not appear I will be able to support a bill."197 Jenkins
was not alone, for on June 5, the House passed the compromise bill supported
by the Democratic leadership by a vote of 273-158, still short of the 290 votes
necessary for a veto override. In fact, the number of votes for the 1991 bill
was precisely the same as that received by the final House version of the 1990
bill, notwithstanding the additional compromises.
While the bill's opponents spoke of victory in light of Bush's promise to
veto,19 the civil rights coalition did its best to explain the vote was not a
defeat, or even a temporary setback. According to Ralph Neas, executive
director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, "It was a good strong
vote that continues the momentum of the past two weeks and positions the bill
well for the Senate."""9 However, "[d]espite the brave face they put on to-
day's outcome, it was a setback for the Democrats, who had expected to show
gains over last year to give the bill momentum."'2° The weak showing in
the House persuaded the civil rights forces that further compromises would
be necessary to win either Bush's approval or sufficient votes to override a
veto.
The Civil Rights Act remained stalled throughout the summer, despite
efforts by moderate Republicans such as John Danforth to forge a compro-
mise.2 1 According to Senator Danforth, the key issue remained the disparate
impact standard. On September 20, Danforth and the Democratic leadership
196. Id.
197. Edsall, supra note 181.
198. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater concluded that "[tihe vote indicates strong support
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Vol. 10: 133, 1992
Victory By Surrender
announced a compromise bill that included new language to address the
disparate impact standard. The new version, which lifted language from the
Americans with Disabilities Act,2" 2 prohibits using hiring criteria with a
disparate impact unless the criteria "is shown to be job-related for the position
in question and is consistent with business necessity."2 3 Supporters of the
compromise bill expressed hope that the new language would insulate it from
the quota charge in light of the fact that the Americans with Disabilities Act
was not challenged as a quota bill. 2' However, as it had rejected previous
compromise efforts, the Administration rejected this too. "Senator Danforth's
tireless efforts on this important matter are deeply appreciated, but regrettably
have not bridged the crucial differences that have persisted throughout the
negotiations," deputy White House press secretary Judy Smith said.2°'
Danforth responded that "[i] t is absolutely incomprehensible to me how anyone
could argue the same civil rights protections available to the disabled should
not be available to blacks and women. "206
Finally, on Wednesday, October 24, and Thursday, October 25, the
legislative logjam broke. During that period of time Republican Senators
confronted the White House, making it clear that some sort of compromise was
necessary to avoid an embarrassing battle within Republican ranks. Key
Republicans negotiated a compromise among themselves on the language used
to define business necessity, and they elicited an additional Administration
concession regarding the upper-most limit of the damages cap.207 The com-
promise bill achieved Bush's approval, clearing the way for passage. 28 In
202. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. (1992).
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announcing his support for the compromise, Bush said, "we have reached an
agreement with Senate Republican and Democratic leaders on a civil rights bill
that will be a source of pride for all Americans. It does not resort to quotas,
and it strengthens the cause of equality in the workplace."2' 9 Both sides
contended that the other had made the significant concessions. 21 The Senate
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by a vote of 93-5 on Oct. 30, 1991,211
and the President signed it on Nov. 21, 1991.212
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS LOBBY: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
Parts I and II examined the deliberations over the Voting Rights Amend-
ments and the Civil Rights Act, focusing on the similarities between the civil
rights leadership's approach in both cases. The debates make clear the extent
to which, in both legislative battles, the civil right lobby avoided the articula-
tion of its civil rights principles and thereby undermined the vision underlying
the legislative proposals. Whether the issue was intent versus effect, opportuni-
ty versus outcome, or color-blind versus color-conscious remedies, the civil
rights lobby backpedaled, hedged, and side-stepped the conservative critique.
From beginning to end, the ideological right defined the terms of the discourse.
And yet, both bills passed. From a bottom line perspective, the strategy
employed by the civil rights leadership should perhaps be emulated, rather than
criticized. The legislative ring is often no-holds-barred, and the civil rights
leadership, like any other lobbying organization, should be allowed to employ
any ethical means necessary to achieve its legislative goals. Intellectual honesty
should not stand in the way of legislative accomplishment.
But more than intellectual honesty is at stake. As this part will discuss, the
subterfuge and obfuscation by the civil rights leadership has its consequences.
Moreover, it is not self-evident that the Voting Rights and Civil Rights Acts
passed because of, rather than despite, the tactics employed. Accordingly, this
part will first address other factors which help explain the passage of the
legislation.
A. Comprehending Success: Extrinsic Factors
In the fall of 1991, David Duke concluded an almost successful run for
Governor of Louisiana and Anita Hill levied sexual harassment charges against
her former boss, then Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas. The impact
209. Bush News Conference On Civil Rights Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, § 1 at 7.
210. Compare C. Boyden Gray, Civil Rights: We Won, They Capitulated, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,
1991, at A3 with William T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., How the Civil Rights Bill Was Really
Passed; The Administration Did Compromise, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1991, at A21.
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212. Ann Devroy, President Bush Signs Civil Rights Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al.
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of these two events on the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was appar-
ent to observers at the time. According to the Chicago Tribune, "Ever since
professor Anita Hill's allegations against Thomas raised the issue of sexual
harassment to the peak of public attention, senators have been tripping over
themselves in a rush to express abhorrence of such behavior. The civil rights
bill gives them an opportunity to vote against it."2"3 As one Republican told
Senator Paul Simon during the vote to confirm Thomas, "[t]his will pass the
civil rights bill. "214 The momentum from the public awareness regarding
sexual harassment was not lost on the civil rights leadership. According to
Ralph Neas, "The public education over the issue of sexual harassment has
served as a catalyst for this renewed interest in the law. There is a dramatically
changed political landscape. What the coalition is asking some senators to do
is match their actions with their rhetoric. "215
After the Senate voted 93-5 to pass the compromise legislation, Judith
Lichtman, president of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, concluded that the
Thomas-Hill fight had helped make clear the necessity for damages in sexual
harassment cases: "The dynamic changed for the White House as well as the
Senate, which felt the wrath of very angry American women and men."
216
Indeed, final testament to the impact of the Thomas/Hill hearings on the
process was the speed with which the Senate took the virtually unprecedented
steps of applying the civil rights law to members of Congress and providing
that individual Senators, not the taxpayers, would be liable for the damag-
es. 217
While Hill's allegations made it difficult for legislators to be seen as
standing against damages for victims of sexual harassment, David Duke's
campaign caused many Republicans to wonder whether they had exhausted the
benefits from running against quotas, at least in the short term. Republicans
had gotten significant political mileage out of the use of the quota label, but
the specter of former Klansman David Duke, running under the Republican
banner, worried many Republicans who feared being associated with Duke's
unreconstructed racism. For their part, many Democrats were eager to focus
on the connections between Bush and Duke. "David Duke has found this bed
very comfortable, but it's the bed that Bush and Reagan made," said Represen-
tative Mike Espy.2"' Accordingly, as one Administration official commented,
the time had come "to clearly distinguish Republicans from Duke."29
Commentators were unequivocal in making clear the link between Bush's
213. Mitchell Locin, Senate's Frayed Image May Help Rights Bill, CHI. TRM., Oct. 17, 1991, at 12.
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change of heart regarding the civil rights bill and the publicity accorded David
Duke. "President Bush has cleared the way for a compromise civil rights
bill . . . .My guess is that the reason could be stated in two words: David
Duke," said columnist William Raspberry.220 Bush's use of quotas was "a
way of claiming to support civil rights without signing a civil rights bill, while
also signalling to economically frightened whites that he was their guy.""
However, when David Duke rose to prominence on a virtually identical
message, "the similarities between [Bush] and Duke frightened him into
principled action."21 In the end, "George Bush may have decided he'd rath-
er have a civil rights bill he could sign than to hitch his political wagon to
hard-core bigots."2" Another columnist concluded that "Bush feared Senate
Republicans would join Democrats to override a civil rights bill veto-leaving
him isolated with Duke and the bedsheet brigade. "224
While the influence of David Duke and Anita Hill on the passage of the
Civil Rights Act is evident, less attention has been given to extrinsic factors
that facilitated the passage of the Voting Rights Amendments. Most notable
among these is the extent to which the Voting Rights Amendments benefitted
not just minorities, but also the Republican Party. The following exchange
during the hearings on the Amendments illustrates how the Amendments would
help Republicans:
Mr. Walter Berns: Incidentally, if you were, Mr. Chairman, a partisan Republi-
can, a very narrowly partisan Republican, you ought to support this legislation.
Senator Hatch: That is right.
Mr. Berns: You are not, but if you were-
Senator Hatch: I agree.
Mr. Berns: You would want to support this legislation because its tendency will
be to build black districts, and the more black districts you can build, or-to put
it this way-the more blacks you can pack into one electoral district, the more
Democratic that district will become, and the more Republican will become the
surrounding districts. It is a plain case of gerrymandering.
Senator Hatch: And that is certainly the way it is going to be used if section 2 is
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passed in its present form. So the very people that this law is supposed to help
are ultimately going to wind up being hurt as far as electoral influence in this
county is concerned, if the proposed changes are made. Am I correct in saying
that?
Mr. Berns: Yes indeed, sir.
Berns' analysis has proven correct, as the Republican Party has joined with
civil rights organizations to bring litigation aimed at creating more minority-
dominated voting districts.226 Specifically, the Republican Party has created
plans to allow civil rights groups to use multi-million dollar computer pro-
grams that make it significantly easier to create redistricting plans to present
to courts.7 The joint projects are underway in a number of states. In New
Jersey, for example, the NAACP and the Republican Party recently argued
before the State Apportionment Commission that it should create at least two
majority black districts in Newark and Elizabeth. 2 ' The reasons Republicans
might join in this project are clear. "You remove black and Hispanic voters
and give them their own district, that is going to make other districts white,
pure and simple," remarked Stuart Rothenberg, editor of the Political Report,
a Washington-based political newsletter.229 "And Democrats have more trou-
ble with white voters."23 ° Some Republicans object to this strategy. Senator
Trent Lott, for example, indicated that "[a] lot of us think it is blatantly unfair
when you say a district has to be carved out" to create minority representa-
tion.23 On the other hand, the practice is Party policy, principally because
of the recognition, even among those who are critical of the policy, that "there
is no question that over the long run, it will redound to the benefit of Republi-
cans. "232
B. Comprehending Failure: The Unseen Costs of Subterfuge
Even if these extrinsic factors indicate that the passage of the Voting Rights
and Civil Rights Act was not entirely dependent upon the strategies employed
by the civil rights leadership, those strategies might arguably be viewed as
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successful in that they made the legislative victories possible, if not certain.
However, this conclusion, while partially correct, ignores the costs inherent
in an approach to civil rights that lacks a coherent vision."'
As we have seen, during the debates over the Voting Rights Amendments,
the bill's supporters refused to endorse a vision of civil rights that focused on
equal outcome as a measure of equal opportunity, emphasized race-conscious-
ness rather than color-blindness, and defined discrimination as systemic,
pervasive, and without regard to motive. Almost ten years later, in the debates
over the Civil Rights Act, the civil rights leadership was again challenged to
defend its vision of equality. "The average white American believes civil rights
legislation is preference legislation," said Representative Vin Weber. 4 More-
over, he continued, "increasing numbers of Democrats believe that they are
perceived as the party of the federal giveaway, of desegregation busing,
affirmative action programs, and a host of issues many white voters view as
unfair and detrimental to their interests."" Again, the civil rights leadership
failed, refusing to endorse a civil rights vision that called for expanding race-
based employment preferences, repudiating traditional definitions of merit and
qualifications, restraining the employer's managerial prerogative, and broaden-
ing federal court protection for employees. In both cases the civil rights
leadership assumed that they need not explain why their legislative program
and their civil rights vision were necessary and appropriate.
The rush to define the Civil Rights bill as anti-preference legislation had
implications for the content of the bill. For example, rather than defend race-
norming and affirmative action as necessary remedial measures, and criticize
the civil service test and tests like it as inadequate measures of qualifica-
tion, 6 the civil rights lobby chose to introduce language limiting race-
norming and prohibiting quotas. 237 The consequences of the civil rights
lobby's approach can also be seen in the aftermath of the fight over the Civil
Rights Act. Due in significant measure to the civil rights lobby's approach,
affirmative action legislation has become anathema in national politics. Ac-
cordingly, for Democrats who supported the Civil Rights bill, it is important
to define the legislation as anti-preference. "I'm going home and say I voted
233. Legislative initiatives are hardly the only area in which those of us committed to civil rights must
be sure to evaluate the hidden costs of tactics which are inconsistent with our ultimate goal. Similar issues
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attorneys for Committee for Creative Non Violence).
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for a bill that outlaws quotas," said Representative William Ford, Chairman
of the House Education and Labor Committee. "And that's going to please
many white voters in my district in suburban Detroit. " "
Moreover, the decision by the civil rights lobby to indulge the anti-prefer-
ence rhetoric of conservatives gave further fodder to conservative politicians
across the nation. Faced with the absence of forceful opposition on the national
level, these candidates were able to parlay their anti-black message into
political office. In North Carolina, Jesse Helms got significant mileage out of
an infamous commercial. On the screen, a pair of white hands crumple a job
rejection letter. "You needed that job and you were the best qualified," says
the narrator, "but they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota.
Is that really fair?"" The quota issue was also used successfully by Pete
Wilson in his defeat of Dianne Feinstein for the California governorship. 24
And in Mississippi, Republican Kirk Fordice upset incumbent Ray Mabus,
using a campaign advertisement that featured a photograph of a young black
woman holding a baby and called for "workfare, not welfare. "241
Finally, the civil rights leadership's repudiation of the only vision of civil
rights capable of supporting significant progressive reform measures has
serious implications for future legislative battles. Meaningful legislative
demands have costs. The costs may be the job opportunities of would-be white
firefighters in Birmingham, the independence of corporate managers, or a
larger federal bench to hear civil rights claims. In any case, pretending that
the demands are free will fool few. The costs must be justified. Civil rights
legislation will only succeed if its supporters are willing and able to articulate
why it is necessary, despite the costs. The success of civil rights legislation
turns on whether the civil rights community is able to convince Congress and
the nation that the moral claim being lodged is sufficiently compelling to justify
the costs to society. Justifying legislation and providing a civil rights vision
to support it will not always be easy, but the failure to do so may well produce
hollow victories.
Moreover, by failing to articulate the true nature of their demands and
underlying vision, civil rights advocates demobilize supporters while encourag-
ing the forces of opposition and retrenchment. In the aftermath of the defeat
of the Civil Rights bill, black leaders congregated in Atlanta to commemorate
the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and to plot strategy for the future.
Many wondered what could be done to recapture the moral authority held by
the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Reverend Joseph Lowery,
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president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, looked back with
fondness on the days when the civil rights movement was able to mobilize its
troops behind a program that was "very simple-whether you sit in a restaurant
or whether you can vote." 242 But Lowery and his compatriots ignored the
fact that the inability to gather support for their cause is directly linked to their
unwillingness to push for a transformative vision of civil rights that challenges
the vision being offered by Republicans and increasing numbers of Democrats.
IV. CONCLUSION
In passing the Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 the civil rights forces have many reasons to be proud. The legislative
victories will translate into votes for blacks and jobs for blacks and women,
no small feats in an era of conservative domination of the national political
process. However, civil rights supporters have reason to be concerned as the
nation approaches the beginning of the 21st century, for in fighting these
legislative battles the civil rights leadership was unwilling or unable to articu-
late and defend a progressive vision of civil rights. The most severe conse-
quences of this failure may yet be in the offing. Those committed to civil rights
would do well to consider carefully the errors of the past, not for the purpose
of apportioning blame or assigning guilt, but rather for the purpose of making
plans for the future.
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